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Abstract—Due to the dramatic increase in high data rate
services and in order to meet the demands of the fifth-generation
(5G) networks, researchers from both academia and industry
are exploring advanced transmission techniques, new network
architectures and new frequency spectrum such as the visible
light and the millimeter wave (mmWave) spectra. Visible light
communication (VLC) particularly is an emerging technology
that has been introduced as a promising solution for 5G and
beyond, owing to the large unexploited spectrum, which trans-
lates to significantly high data rates. Although VLC systems
are more immune against interference and less susceptible to
security vulnerabilities since light does not penetrate through
walls, security issues arise naturally in VLC channels due to
their open and broadcasting nature, compared to fiber-optic
systems. In addition, since VLC is considered to be an enabling
technology for 5G, and security is one of the 5G fundamental
requirements, security issues should be carefully addressed and
resolved in the VLC context. On the other hand, due to the
success of physical layer security (PLS) in improving the security
of radio-frequency (RF) wireless networks, extending such PLS
techniques to VLC systems has been of great interest. Only two
survey papers on security in VLC have been published in the
literature. However, a comparative and unified survey on PLS
for VLC from information theoretic and signal processing point
of views is still missing. This paper covers almost all aspects of
PLS for VLC, including different channel models, input distribu-
tions, network configurations, precoding/signaling strategies, and
secrecy capacity and information rates. Furthermore, we propose
a number of timely and open research directions for PLS-VLC
systems, including the application of measurement-based indoor
and outdoor channel models, incorporating user mobility and
device orientation into the channel model, and combining VLC
and RF systems to realize the potential of such technologies.
Keywords—Physical layer security, visible light communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
The total data traffic is expected to become about 49
exabytes per month by 2021, while while in 2016, it was
approximately 7.24 exabytes per month [1]. With this drastic
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Fig. 1: Requirements of 5G enabled internet of things (IoT).
increase, 5G networks must urgently provide high data rates,
seamless connectivity, robust security and ultra-low latency
communications [2]–[4]. In addition, with the emergence of
the internet-of-things (IoT) networks, the number of connected
devices to the internet is increasing dramatically [5], [6].
This fact implies not only a significant increase in data
traffic, but also the emergence of some IoT services with
crucial requirements. As shown in Fig. 1, such requirements
include high data rates, high connection density, ultra reliable
low latency communication (URLLC) and security. Hence,
traditional radio-frequency (RF) networks, which are already
crowded, are unable to satisfy these high demands [7]. Net-
work densification [8], [9] has been proposed as a solution to
increase the capacity and coverage of 5G networks. However,
with the continuous dramatic growth in data traffic, researchers
from both industry and academia are trying to explore new
network architectures, new transmission techniques and new
spectra to meet these demands. One of the new communication
technologies that has been proposed as an auspicious solution
for 5G and beyond is visible light communication (VLC).
VLC is a promising technology that has been introduced
as an auspicious solution for 5G and beyond. VLC operates
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in the visible light frequency spectrum and uses light for both
illumination and data communication purposes simultaneously.
VLC has gained significant interest due to its high data rates
[10]. The motivation behind the interest in VLC is twofold:
1) The advantages that VLC offers when compared to RF,
including the large available frequency spectrum [11], high
speed and robustness against interference [12], and 2) the
availability of low cost light emitting diodes (LEDs) [13].
LEDs exhibit a high electrical-to-optical conversion efficiency,
long life span, low cost and high operational speed [14]–
[17]. While VLC technologies bring efficient solutions to
many real-life problems, they are not intended to replace RF
technologies. Rather, VLC can be viewed as a complementary
technology to RF. There are applications where VLC is more
efficient than RF, whereas there are other applications where
the opposite is true. As such, both technologies should be
exploited together to meet the expectations of 5G networks
(see Fig. 1.) and beyond, including security. Some of the noted
advantages of VLC systems over RF systems is the higher
security that VLC systems provide. This is basically inherited
from to the fact that light does not penetrate through walls.
However, security issues arise naturally in VLC systems due
to their open and broadcasting nature [18]. Specifically, VLC
systems could be as vulnerable as their RF counterparts when
their nodes are deployed in public areas and/or when there are
large windows in the coverage areas [19]. Thus, security for
VLC systems is as important as it is for RF systems.
Security in wireless communication systems, including 5G
wireless networks, may be enhanced by introducing physical
layer security (PLS) techniques [20], [21]. In fact, PLS tech-
niques have been applied to a wide range of RF applications
in an effort to improve the overall system security by com-
plementing existing cryptography-based security techniques
[22]. The potential of PLS stems from its ability to leverage
features of the surrounding environments via sophisticated
encoding techniques at the physical layer [23]. Indeed, PLS
schemes can be applied in the same spirit to VLC systems.
However, many fundamental specificities exist in the transmis-
sion protocols and modulation schemes of VLC systems that
make them different from RF systems. In fact, the channels
and transmitted optical signals in VLC are real and positive
valued. In addition, due to the limited dynamic range of the
LEDs [24], VLC systems impose a peak-power constraint,
i.e., amplitude constraint, on the channel input, which makes
unbounded inputs not admissible. Note that RF signals are
equally amplitude-bounded and the peak-to-average power
ratio (PAPR) is a problem for RF power amplifiers. However,
in VLC systems, high PAPR is used for intensity-modulation
direct detection (IM/DD), which is the case for the direct
current (DC) biased optical orthogonal frequency division mul-
tiplexing (DCO-OFDM) [25]. Due to these differences, PLS
techniques developed for RF systems may not extend to VLC
systems in a straightforward manner, which necessitates the
development of new PLS schemes specific to VLC systems.
B. Related Work
Several survey papers have been reported over the past
few years in the literature on VLC-related technologies [26]–
[38]. However, a comprehensive and comparative study on
securing VLC systems, at least from a PLS perspective, is
still missing. Specifically, the authors in [26] presented the
differences among various categories of optical wireless com-
munications (OWC) technologies such as free space optical
(FSO) communications, VLC and light fidelity (LiFi). Over
the last few years, [27]–[29] were the first papers that reviewed
LED-based VLC systems and their applications. In [30], the
authors brought attention to the strongest feature of LEDs,
which which is their ability to provide smart lighting and
data transmission simultaneously. Along the same lines, the
authors of [31] highlighted the benefits and challenges of VLC
networks, as compared to RF networks. In [32], the authors
studied the methods employed for enhancing the performance
of VLC, including modulation schemes and dimming control
techniques, while in [33], the authors focused on the VLC
link level transmission, the medium access techniques and the
visible light sensing. On the other hand, the authors in [34]
focused on the channel models for VLC, whereas the authors
in [35] reviewed the optical noise sources and noise mitigation
mechanisms for VLC. A study on interference reduction
techniques in VLC was recently presented in [36], where
the authors reviewed and compared two different designs for
VLC networks, namely, the user-centric network and network-
centric designs. Positioning and localization techniques for
indoor and outdoor VLC applications were reviewed in [37].
Recently, the authors in [38] surveyed all the optimization
techniques, previously reported in the literature, that aim to
improve the performance of VLC systems, with emphasis
on new technologies such as non-orthogonal multiple-access
(NOMA), simultaneous wireless information and power trans-
fer (SWIPT), cooperative transmission, space division multiple
access (SDMA), and PLS. The same authors reviewed in [39]
the majority of the work conducted on PLS for VLC and FSO
networks, and proposed several open problems to optimize and
enhance the security performance of these systems. However,
the coverage of PLS-VLC in these two papers is rather limited
in scope and/or depth. For instance, a large number of recently
published papers on this topic were not covered; some of the
covered aspects, such as information theoretic security, lacked
depth and breadth, owing to the relatively wide coverage scope
of those papers; and several key system design challenges
were not addressed. Such design issues include input signaling
schemes (continuous versus discrete), transmission schemes
(spatial modulation, spatial multiplexing, etc.), the geometry
and parameters of VLC networks, availability of the channel
state information (CSI), real-life measurement-based channel
models, users mobility, devices orientation and links blockage.
In this paper, however, we address all of the above-mentioned
challenges where we provide an in-depth coverage of all
published papers on PLS-VLC. In addition, we present a
comparative study of existing techniques, and propose future
research directions that incorporate several realistic system
design parameters.
In terms of PLS for RF systems, several review arti-
cles have been reported in the literature [40]–[45], which
provided comprehensive overviews and insightful comments
to understand the fundamental principles, technology status,
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and future trends of PLS. In [40], security features, security
vulnerabilities, and existing security solutions for long term
evolution (LTE) and LTE-advanced were reviewed. In [41],
the authors reviewed the secrecy performance from a PLS
perspective of broadcast and multi-antenna systems, with
an emphasis on the multiple-access channel (MAC), relay
channels, physical-layer key generation and secure coding.
The authors in [42] reviewed different jamming techniques,
employed in the literature, that aim at improving the secrecy
performance of RF networks. In [43], the authors provided
a comprehensive review on various multiple-antenna tech-
niques in PLS, with an emphasis on transmit beamforming
designs for multiple-antenna nodes in point-to-point systems
and heterogeneous networks. In [44], the fundamentals and
technologies of PLS were reviewed and the technologies,
challenges, and solutions were also summarized from differ-
ent methodological viewpoints that involve wiretap coding,
multi-antenna and relay cooperation and physical-layer au-
thentication. In [45], security designs from optimization and
signal processing viewpoints were reviewed, where the authors
summarized all the PLS techniques pertaining to resource al-
location, beamforming/precoding, antenna/node selection and
cooperation. Although several PLS techniques were proposed
in the literature for RF systems, as mentioned above, the
adoption of techniques developed for RF channels can not be
straightforwardly applied to VLC channels.
C. Contributions and Outline
Most of the research done on PLS-VLC can be classi-
fied as either information theoretic, i.e., secrecy capacity,
achievable secrecy rate and capacity-equivocation region; or
signal processing-based, i.e., precoding, beamforming, and
optimization. This paper aims at providing a unified overview
of all PLS-VLC related studies that have been published so
far. Among the features considered in this study are: 1) the
characteristics of the VLC channel; 2) the input distribu-
tion (continuous versus discrete); 3) the architectures of the
transmitter/receiver; 4) the numbers of legitimate users and
unauthorized receivers; 5) the availability of channel state
information (CSI); and 6) the geometry of the place of deploy-
ment and the type of signaling scheme employed. Four types
of VLC systems are studied in this paper, which are the single-
input-single-output (SISO), the multiple-input-single-output
(MISO), the multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) and the
hybrid RF/VLC. For each type, both cases of single active
user (AU) and multiple AUs are considered and the effect
of the number and CSI of the eavesdroppers (EDs) on the
secrecy performance is also discussed. Furthermore, several
open research problems are proposed to further advance the
state-of-the-art of VLC technologies.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In Section II,
the generalized model of VLC wiretap systems is presented.
Specifically, in this section, the paper provide a brief overview
about the VLC channel model adopted in the literature and
discusses the constraints that must be taken into account in
designing the transmission strategies and PLS schemes for
VLC. In Section III, all the PLS schemes employed for the
TABLE I: Table of Abbreviations
5G Fifth generation
AP Access point
AU Active user
CSI Channel state information
DD Direct detection
ED eavesdropper
IM Intensity modulation
LED Light emitting diode
LiFi Light-fidelity
LoS Line of sight
MIMO Multiple-input-multiple-output
MISO Multiple-input-single-output
NOMA Non orthogonal multiple access
PD photo diode
PLS Physical layer security
PPP Poisson point process
RF Radio-frequency
SISO Single-input-single-output
SINR Signal to interference plus noise ratio
SNR Signal to noise ratio
SOP Secrecy outage probability
VLC Visible light communication
MIMO VLC system are reviewed. In Section IV, all the works
related to secure MISO VLC systems from a PLS point of view
are reviewed. In Section V, all the PLS techniques employed
for the SISO VLC system are reviewed. In Section VI, the
secrecy performance of hybrid wireless systems that combine
both RF and VLC transmissions is reviewed. In Section VII,
some open research directions on securing VLC systems with
their associated challenges are presented. Specifically, in this
section, the paper discusses several problems that have not
been investigated, and proposes various ideas on how to
improve the secrecy performance of real-life and practical
VLC systems. In Section VIII, a summary of the paper is
provided.
D. Notations and Abbreviations
The following notations are adopted throughout the paper.
Upper case bold characters denote matrices and lower case
bold characters denote column vectors. J1, NK denotes the
discrete interval with bounds 1 and N , N denotes the set of
natural numbers, RN denotes the set of N -dimensional real-
valued vectors and RN+ denotes the set of N -dimensional real-
valued vectors with positive elements. {·}T denotes transpose
operator, {·}−1 denotes matrix inversion and | · | denotes the
absolute value of the determinant. || · ||∞ and || · ||2 denote
the infinity norm and the Euclidean norm, respectively. Fs
and fs denote the joint cumulative distribution function and
the joint probability mass/density function of s. E(·) denotes
the expected value, I(·; ·) denotes the mutual information
and C+ = max(C, 0). We use log[·], without a base, to
denote natural logarithms and information rates are specified
in (nats/s/Hz). A list of abbreviations used in this paper is
presented in Table I.
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Fig. 2: A MIMO VLC system consisting of a transmitter with
M = 9 APs, multiple AUs and multiple EDs. All receivers
are equipped with 4 PDs each (highlighted in white).
II. GENERALIZED MODEL OF VLC WIRETAP SYSTEMS
Consider the IM/DD VLC wiretap system shown in Fig. 2,
which consists of a room of size L ×W × H , where L, W
and H denotes the length, the width and the height of the
room. The transmitter, assumed to be equipped with M APs
and located on the ceiling of the room, wants to transmit N
sets of confidential messages to N AUs in the presence of K
EDs. For all i ∈ J1, NK, the ith AU is equipped with Ni ∈ N
PDs, whereas for all k ∈ J1,KK, the kth ED is equipped with
Kj ∈ N PDs. At each channel use, the N sets of confidential
messages are encoded into an M × 1 zero mean vector s and
then transmitted through the M LED arrays. Based on this,
the transmitted signal s is expressed as
s =
N∑
i=1
si, (1)
where, for all i ∈ J1, NK, si is the M × 1 precoded signal
intended to the ith AU. Based on the above, for i ∈ J1, NK
and k ∈ J1,KK, the received signals at the ith AU and the kth
ED are expressed, respectively, as
yi = His + nAU,i
zk = Gks + nED,k, (2)
where Hi and Gk are the Ni×M and Kk×M channel matrices
of the ith AU and the kth ED, respectively, and nAU,i and
nED,k are multivariate additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
that are N (0, σ2AINi) and N (0, σ2EIKk) distributed, respec-
tively. It is important to highlight that, since the legitimate
receivers are usually active, the CSI of each AU is available
at the transmitter through a limited-feedback mechanism [46]–
[48]. However, this is not the case for the EDs. In fact, the
CSI of the EDs are not available at the transmitter in general,
especially if they are passive or not registered in the network.
The system model presented above refers to the generalized
MIMO VLC wiretap system [49] and it includes all varieties of
VLC wiretap systems for any number of APs M , any number
of AUs N and any number of EDs K, as well as any number
of PDs at each receiver. When all receivers are equipped
Fig. 3: VLC path gain description.
with a single PD, the system is scaled down to the MISO
VLC wiretap system. Additionally, when the transmitter is
equipped with one AP, i.e., M = 1, the system corresponds to
the SISO VLC wiretap system. The secrecy performance and
the suitable PLS techniques of VLC wiretap systems depend
mainly on the parameters M , N and K, as well as the number
of PDs and the availability of the CSI of each receiver.
It is important to mention that almost all work on secure
VLC systems have only considered the LoS component hLoS
presented in (2) in their adopted VLC channel models and
ignored the NLoS component hNLoS. This is mainly due to
two reasons: 1) no closed-form expression for the NLoS
component hNLoS is readily available in the literature, and 2)
the optical power received from signals reflected more than
once is negligible compared to the LoS component, especially
if the receiver is far away from the walls or is located close
to the cell center [50]. Thus, unless otherwise stated, only the
LoS component is considered in the analysis presented in this
paper. In this case, assuming that the considered LEDs have
a Lambertian emission pattern, the LoS component hLoS of
the channel gain between one fixture of LEDs and one PD is
expressed as [51], [52]
hLoS = ηRpT
(m+ 1)
2pi
n2cAg
sin(Ψ)2
cosm(θ)
cos(ψ)
d2
rect
(
ψ
Ψ
)
,
(3)
where m = − log(2)log(cos(θ1/2)) is the order of the Lambertian
emission, such that θ1/2 represents the half-power semi-angle
of the LED, Ag is the geometric area of the PD, nc is the
refractive index of the receiver’s optical concentrator, and as
shown in Fig 3, Ψ is the field of view (FoV) of the receiver’s
PD, d =
√
r2 + z2 is the Euclidean distance between the LED
and the PD, such that r and z are the horizontal and vertical
distances between the LED and the PD, θ ∈ [0, θ1/2] is the
radiation angle and ψ ∈ [0, pi] is the incidence angle.
Typical LEDs suffer from nonlinear distortion and clipping
effects, which imposes additional operating constraints on the
emitted optical power [53]–[55]. Due to this, the transmitted
signal s should satisfy a peak-power constraint, i.e., an ampli-
tude constraint, that is expressed as
||s||∞ ≤ A, (4)
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where A is the maximum allowed signal amplitude at the
input of each fixture of LEDs. The peak-power constraint
implies that the information bearing signal s is bounded.
Consequently, from an information-theoretic perspective, the
capacity achieving input distribution can not be Gaussian,
since Gaussian inputs are not admissible for such constraints
[56]. However, it is shown in [57] that the channel can be
modelled in the electrical domain as an AWGN channel
with an average power constraint, and this falls within the
Shannon framework which determines the upper bound on the
achievable data rate. In the following sections, we review
all the works related to secure VLC systems as well as all
the associated PLS techniques reported in the literature. For
ease of presentation, we group those techniques according to
what system model they have been developed for, e.g., MIMO,
MISO and SISO.
III. THE MIMO VLC WIRETAP SYSTEM
A. Single ED
For the special case when N = 1 AU and K = 1 ED, the
secrecy capacity of the MIMO VLC wiretap channel in (2) is
given by [58], [59]
Cs = max
Fs
[I (s; y1)− I (s; z1)]+
s.t
∫
S
dFs(x) = 1,
(5)
where S = [−A,A]M . In general, neither the secrecy capacity
Cs nor the optimal probability distribution that achieves Cs,
i.e., the one that solve the optimization problem in (5), have
been determined in closed-form expression or at least charac-
terized in the literature, except some special cases that will be
discussed later in the paper. Due to this, based on the system
configuration and the type of the input signaling scheme,
several upper and lower bounds were derived in the literature
in order to characterize the secrecy performance of the MIMO
VLC wiretap channel. In this context, it should be noted that
conceptually there are two approaches for transmission design
of MIMO wiretap channels. One is to perform precoding under
fixed input probability distribution and system constraints. The
other is to optimize the input distributions that can achieve
secrecy rates as close as possible to the secrecy capacity [60].
Although security for VLC systems was extensively studied
in the literature, only a few papers investigated the secrecy
performance of MIMO VLC systems [61]–[64]. For the case
of N = 1 AU and K = 1 ED, the authors in [61] derived
an achievable secrecy rate for the system using continuous
log-concave distributions. Afterwards, an iterative algorithm
based on the convex-concave procedure (CCP) was proposed
to jointly obtain the best covariance matrix and signaling
scheme. From the information-theoretic point of view, even
if continuous input signaling schemes achieve the secrecy
capacity of MIMO system, continuous transmit signals are
rarely used in practical communication systems. This is mainly
due to the fact that, if the probability density function (pdf)
of a transmit signal is continuous, the task of signal detection
at the receiver will be significantly complicated. Therefore, in
practice, transmit signals are discrete signals drawn from finite
discrete constellations, such as pulse amplitude modulation
(PAM) in the context of optical wireless communication. Due
to this fact, the authors in [62] derived an achievable secrecy
rate for the same system using discrete distributions with finite
support sets. This achievable secrecy rate is given by R+s,1,
where
Rs,1 =
1
2
log [det (B)]− log
 Q∑
i=1
Q∑
j=1
pipj exp
(
di,j
2σ2A
)
− 1
2
log
[
det
(
IK1 +
G1KsGT1
σ2E
)]
,
(6)
in which Ks represents the covariance matrix of the transmitted
signal s, B = 2IN1 −
(
IN1 +
H1KsHT1
σ2A
)−1
and, for all i, j ∈J1, QK,
di,j =
(
qi + qj
)T HT1 B−1H1 (qi + qj)
− ||H1qi||22 −
∣∣∣∣H1qj∣∣∣∣22 , (7)
such that Q represents the number of mass points of s,
{qi |i ∈ J1, QK} is its set of mass points and {pi |i ∈ J1, QK}
is its set of mass probabilities. The core idea behind the
achievable secrecy rate R+s,1 is based on the relation embedded
on the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence, also known as
the relative entropy, between continuous and discrete input
distributions that have the same covariance matrix [65]. In
addition, the achievable secrecy rate R+s,1 is valid for all
possible configurations of the considered MIMO VLC wiretap
channel, i.e., MIMO, MISO and SISO VLC wiretap channels.
Motivated by the result in (6), the authors in [62] inves-
tigated the case where the transmitter aims to send a zero-
mean vector u containing L confidential messages, where
1 ≤ L ≤M , to the AU in the presence of an ED. Therefore,
the transmitted signal is expressed as s = s1 = Wu, where W
is the associated M×L precoding matrix. In this case, u and W
were assumed to satisfy ||u||∞ ≤ A and ||W||∞ ≤ 1 in order
to fulfill the amplitude constraint in (4). Moreover, the authors
in [62] assumed that the confidential messages are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d) according to a generic scalar
random variable u that follows a truncated discrete generalized
normal (TDGN) distribution within [−A,A]. Moreover, the
ED was assumed to be randomly located within the coverage
area and a precoding scheme based on the generalized singular
value decomposition (GSVD) of the channel matrices was
proposed in order to enhance the secrecy performance of the
system.
As an illustration, Fig. 4 presents the average achievable
secrecy rate R+s,1, obtained through 10
5 independent Monte-
Carlo trials on the location of the AU and the ED, versus the
square of the amplitude constraint A2 in [dBm], for the system
configurations (M,N,K) = (4, 4, 4), (4, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 1)
and for the number of mass points Qu = 2 and Qu = 4 of the
random scalar variable u. The number of confidential messages
is fixed to L = 1 and the precoding matrix W was optimized
using the brute force (BF) search methods. The noise variance
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Fig. 4: Average achievable secrecy rate R+s,1 versus the square
of the amplitude constraint A2, for the system configurations
(M,N,K) = (4, 4, 4), (4, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 1) and for the
number of mass points Qu = 2 and Qu = 4.
at the two receivers is fixed to σ2A = σ
2
E = −68.93 [dBm].
Fig. 4 shows that increasing the number of light sources of
the transmitter and/or increasing the number of PDs at the
receivers will increase the achievable secrecy rate R+s,1. In
other words, it shows that increasing the system diversity will
improve the secrecy performance of the system. In addition,
Fig. 4 shows that the best number of mass points Qu is a
function of the operating range of the amplitude constraint A.
On the other hand, an upper bound on the secrecy capacity
Cs was derived in [61], [62]. The key idea was converting
the amplitude constraint into an average power constraint as
||s||∞ ≤ A =⇒ Trace(Ks) = E
(
sT s
) ≤MA2, which is the
trace constraint on the input covariance. The derived upper
bound is given by
UB = max
Ks≥0
1
2
log
det
(
IM + 1σ2AH
T
1 H1Ks
)
det
(
IM + 1σ2E G
T
1 G1Ks
)

s.t. Trace(Ks) ≤MA2. (8)
It was stated in [66] that the optimal covariance matrix,
solution of the optimization problem in (8), is expressed
through the active eigenvectors, i.e., the ones associated to
positive eigenvalues, of the matrix H
T
1 H1
σ2A
− GT1 G1
σ2E
. Based on
this, the closed form expression of the upper bound (8) was
derived for the special case where the number of PDs at
the receivers is one, i.e., the SISO and MISO VLC wiretap
systems. However, for the general case, iterative approaches
were employed in [61], [62] in order to solve the optimization
problem in (8).
B. Multiple EDs
For a MIMO VLC system with N = 1 AU and multiple
EDs, the authors in [63] established a secure communication
mechanism by minimizing the bit error rate (BER) in a pro-
tected zone and maximizing it everywhere else. On the other
hand, for a MIMO VLC system with multiple AUs and multi-
ple EDs, the authors of [64] improved the secrecy performance
by using a continuous signaling scheme and applying angle
diversity transmitters that are capable of transmitting data
in narrow beams and effectively minimizing the leakage of
information. By comparing different types of optical network
deployments, they concluded that the hexagonal deployment
is the best in terms of secure communications, whereas the
Poisson point process (PPP) deployment is the worst.
IV. THE MISO VLC WIRETAP SYSTEM
In this section, each receiver is equipped with a single PD.
The transmitter intends to transmit N sets of confidential
messages to N spatially dispersed AUs in the presence of
K EDs. As such, for all i ∈ J1, NK and k ∈ J1,KK, the
received signals at the ith AU and the kth ED are expressed,
respectively, as
yi = hTi s + nA,i
zk = gTk s + nE,k, (9)
where hi, gk ∈ RM+ are the M ×1 channel gain vectors of the
ith AU and the kth ED, respectively, and nA,i and nE,k are
AWGN samples that are N (0, σ2A) and N (0, σ2E) distributed,
respectively. In the following subsections, we review all the
works reported in the literature on secure MISO VLC systems
for the two cases when the transmitter communicates with a
single AU or with multiple AUs.
A. Single AU
For a single AU, a large body of work in the literature
proposed various PLS techniques that aim to provide secure
communications, for both cases of single ED [67]–[81] and
multiple EDs [82]–[86]. In the following, both cases of single
and multiple EDs will be studied, respectively.
Single ED. In this case, it was shown in [87] that the optimal
joint probability distribution fs of the transmitted signal s
that achieves the secrecy capacity of the system is unique,
symmetric and discrete with a finite support set. However,
neither the secrecy capacity nor the optimal input probability
distribution were derived in closed-form and, thus, it remains
an open problem. Therefore, both continuous [67]–[75] and
discrete [76]–[81] signaling schemes were employed, in order
to characterize the secrecy capacity of the system. In addition,
beamforming and artificial noise based beamforming are the
widely used PLS techniques for securing MISO VLC systems.
For the case of continuous signaling schemes, beamforming
was employed in [67]–[70]. With beamforming, the trans-
mitted signal is expressed as s = vu, where u denotes the
confidential message intended to the AU and v denotes its
associated beamforming vector. In [67]–[69], the pdf of u was
assumed to be uniform within [−A,A] and the authors inves-
tigated the performance of beamforming for both scenarios,
namely, when the ED’s CSI is available at the transmitter or
not. In the former scenario, zero-forcing (ZF) beamforming,
also known as null steering, was employed in order to force
the ED’s reception to zero, i.e., gT1 v = 0. However, in the latter
case, the ED was assumed to be located within a predefined
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area known to the transmitter and robust beamforming was em-
ployed in order to maximize the worst case achievable secrecy
rate. In [70], the authors used the truncated generalized normal
(TGN) distribution as a probability distribution for u and
derived closed-form expression for the optimal beamformer
that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate of the system. In
addition, they optimized over the TGN parameters to further
enhance the secrecy performance of the system.
Artificial noise based beamforming was adopted in [71]–
[75]. Specifically, in [71], [72], the proposed schemes consist
of transmitting the information bearing signal from one AP
and jamming signals from the remaining APs. Moreover, the
information bearing and jamming signals were assumed to
follow uniform distributions in [71] and truncated Gaussian
distributions in [72]. In [73], [74], the authors proposed an
artificial noise based beamforming scheme where, based on
the available CSI of the AU and the ED, each transmitter’s
AP can choose to convey data or jamming signals. In [75],
the information bearing signal and the jamming signals were
transmitted jointly through all APs. Specifically, the proposed
scheme in [75] consists of simultaneously transmitting a scalar
information signal u and a scalar jamming signal x through
two different beamforming vectors v and w, respectively. In
this case, the transmitted signal is given by s = vu + wx.
In addition, both u and x were assumed to follow a TGN
distribution and the effect of the jamming signal was forced
to be canceled at the AU, i.e., hT1 w = 0. Moreover, u, x, v
and w were assumed to satisfy |u| ≤ A2 , |x| ≤ A2 , ||v||∞ ≤ 1
and ||w||∞ ≤ 1 in order to satisfy the the amplitude constraint
||s||∞ ≤ 1 imposed on the transmitted signal s. Note that in
[72], [75], both cases of perfect and imperfect ED’s CSI were
considered, where the derived achievable secrecy rates were
maximized with respect to the corresponding beamforming
vectors in the former case, and robust beamforming employed
in the latter case.
For the case of discrete signaling schemes, beamforming
was employed in [76], where the authors tried to solve the
secrecy capacity numerically since no closed-form expression
of the secrecy capacity has been derived yet. In [77]–[79],
artificial noise aided precoding was employed. Specifically, in
[77], the adopted secrecy performance measure is the signal to
interference plus noise ratio (SINR) and the proposed scheme
consists of transmitting a scalar information bearing signal
through beamforming simultaneously with different jamming
signals that are linearly precoded into a multi-dimensional
jamming vector, i.e., s = vu + Wx, where x is a vector of
the jamming signals and W is its associated precoding matrix.
In the same context, the authors in [78] recently employed
the same artificial noise based beamforming scheme adopted
in [75]. However, differing from [75], both the information
bearing signal u and the jamming signal x were drawn from
a TDGN distribution. In addition, the ED was assumed to be
randomly located in the coverage area and the authors used
a stochastic geometry model to evaluate the statistics of the
ED’s SINR and the average achievable secrecy rate of the
system. Moreover, u, x, w1 and w2 were assumed to satisfy
|u| ≤ αA, |x| ≤ (1−α)A, ||v||∞ ≤ 1 and ||w||∞ ≤ 1 in order
to satisfy the amplitude constraint in (4), where α ∈]0, 1].
Fig. 5: Optimal fraction of amplitude α allocated to the
information bearing signal versus the location of the ED within
a room of size 8m×8m×4m. The transmitter is equipped with
M = 16 APs and the AU is located at the center of the room.
As an illustration, consider a room of size 8m×8m×4m. The
transmitter is equipped with 16 APs located on the ceiling of
the room and at the positions (x, y) ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7}×{1, 3, 5, 7}.
The AU is located at the center of the room and the ED is
randomly located within the room. Since the transmitter has
no information about the CSI of the ED, the best transmission
strategy to adopt at the transmitter is to send the information
bearing signal u into the direction of the AU, i.e., v = h1||h1||∞ ,
and the jamming signal into the orthogonal direction of the
the AU, i.e., w ∈ Null (h1). Based on this scheme, Fig. 5
presents the optimal fraction of amplitude α allocated to the
information bearing signal, i.e., the one that maximizes the
secrecy performance of the system, versus the location of the
ED where A
2
σ2A
= A
2
σ2E
= 98.83 dB. This figure shows that when
the ED is close to the AU, the amplitude fraction α decreases.
Meaning, the transmitter have to allocate more amplitude, and
power equivalently, to the jamming signals in order to degrade
the reception of the ED.
The potential of spatial modulation (SM) to enhance the se-
crecy performance of MISO VLC wiretap systems was inves-
tigated in [79]–[81]. Specifically, in [79], artificial noise based
beamforming was proposed, where SM was used to transmit
the information bearing signal and truncated Gaussian was
adopted for the jamming signal. In [81], the authors studied
the secrecy performance of the MISO VLC system employing
SM, termed as the MISO SM-VLC. The authors obtained a
lower bound and an accurate closed-form expression for the
approximate achievable secrecy rate of the generalized space
shift keying (GSSK) VLC system and also derived closed-form
expressions for the pairwise error probability and bit error rate
of the system. Similar results were obtained in [80], where the
authors proposed a LED pattern selection algorithm in order to
enhance the secrecy performance of the GSSK VLC system.
Multiple EDs. For the case of multiple EDs, both con-
tinuous [82]–[85] and discrete [86] signaling schemes were
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employed. However, only beamforming was employed to
secure this class of VLC systems. In [82], [83], the authors
proposed a LED selection scheme to improve the secrecy
outage probability (SOP) of the system. The SOP represents
the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity Cs
falls below a target secrecy rate Rth [88], i.e., P (Cs ≤ Rth).
However, due to the amplitude constraint imposed on the
transmitted signal, the secrecy capacity is not readily available
and a modified SOP was employed as a secrecy performance
measure instead. In addition, the authors in [82], [83] assumed
that the EDs are not colluding. In this case, only the ED
with the strongest SNR is considered as a potential threat.
Moreover, the EDs were assumed to be randomly located
in the coverage area and thus their CSI is unknown to the
transmitter. In such a case, stochastic geometry approaches
can be used to characterize the system secrecy performance.
These approaches are based on proposing stochastic geometric
models for the channel gains of the EDs [89], [90]. Stochastic
geometry is a powerful tool for dealing with spatial uncertainty
[91], [92]. In fact, when the EDs are distributed randomly
in the considered area, stochastic geometry can be used to
determine the statistics of their individual CSI and, thus,
it can provide closed-form expressions for typical secrecy
performance measures. In [82], [83], the number of EDs was
modeled using the PPP model and the locations of each ED
were assumed to be uniform within the coverage area. Based
on this, the authors employed a stochastic geometry model to
derive a closed-form expression of the SOP and proposed a
beamforming scheme that enhances the secrecy performance.
The same problem but with colluding and randomly lo-
cated EDs was considered in [84]. The authors employed
beamforming as a transmission strategy and used stochastic
geometry to derive an approximate expression of the average
achievable secrecy rate. Then, the resulting problem of optimal
beamforming that maximizes the average achievable secrecy
rate was solved. In [85], an experimental artificial noise based
precoding scheme was proposed. The experimental setup con-
sists of eight arrays of LEDs, where four arrays are used for
data transmission and four arrays are used for artificial noise
transmission. Experimental and simulation results show that
the proposed scheme highly outperforms the scheme that does
not inject artificial noise. In [86], the EDs were assumed to
be colluding and randomly located similar to [84]. However,
differing from [84], only discrete input signaling schemes
were employed and the authors derived an average achiev-
able secrecy rate using stochastic geometry and proposed a
beamforming solution that maximizes the resulting average
achievable secrecy rate.
B. Multiple AUs
Several studies in the literature have proposed transmission
strategies and precoding designs to secure MU-MISO VLC
broadcast channels [93]–[101]. It was assumed in [93]–[96]
that there were no EDs, but the AUs were treated as potential
EDs when a message was not intended for them, i.e., when the
messages were confidential. In [97]–[101], however, external
EDs were assumed to coexist with the AUs, while the AUs
were continually treated as potential EDs.
Although it was assumed in [93]–[96] that there is no
external ED in the vicinity of the AUs, the transmitted
messages to the AUs were assumed to be confidential, such
that each AU is supposed to receive and decode only its own
message, i.e., users remain ignorant about messages that are
not intended to them. In other words, the transmitter has to
communicate each message to its intended AU while keeping
each AU unaware of the other messages. In [93], the secrecy
performance of a two-user MISO broadcast channel with
confidential messages was considered, where a per-antenna
amplitude constraint and a per-antenna power constraint were
assumed and the authors investigated the problem of optimal
linear precoding schemes. ZF precoding in conjunction with
continuous uniform signaling scheme was employed in [94],
[95] to cancel information leakage between users. The same
problem was investigated in [96], where the transmitter was
assumed to communicate with multiple spatially dispersed
AUs. Linear precoding schemes were developed to enhance
the secrecy performance of the system. In this context, typical
secrecy performance measures, such as the max-min fairness,
the harmonic mean, the proportional fairness and the weighted
fairness, were investigated. These secrecy performance mea-
sures are defined as follows. Let S be the objective function
that represents the secrecy performance measure of interest
and for all i ∈ J1, NK, let Ri be the achievable secrecy rate
of the ith AU. Thus, the aforementioned secrecy performance
measures are defined as [102]:
i) Max-min fairness: S = min
1≤i≤N
Rs,i.
ii) Harmonic mean: S = K
(∑N
i=1R
−1
i
)−1
.
iii) Proportional fairness: S =
(∏N
i=1Ri
) 1
K
.
iv) Weighted fairness: S =
∑N
i=1 αiRi, where (αi)1≤i≤N ∈
R+,
with an increasing order of achievable secrecy sum-rate and a
decreasing order of user fairness [102].
The problem of secure MU-MISO brodcast channels with
multiple EDs was investigated in [97]–[101]. For the case
when there is only one ED, i.e., K = 1, the authors in [97],
[98] studied the potential of employing ZF precoding and
artificial noise schemes in providing secure VLC communi-
cations. In the same case, an artificial noise based precoding
scheme was proposed in [99], [100]. The proposed scheme
was designed to solve the max-min fairness SINR problem
among AUs in two different scenarios: known and unknown
ED’s CSI at the transmitter. In the former case, the proposed
scheme was designed in such a way that it kept the SINR of
the ED below a predefined threshold, whereas in the latter
case, the traditional null-space artificial noise scheme was
employed, which consists of sending jamming signals in all
the orthogonal directions of the AUs. For the case when
K > 1, the authors in [101] proposed a three-dimensional
network model, where the VLC APs were modeled by a two-
dimensional homogeneous PPP in the ceiling and the locations
of of both the AUs and the EDs were modeled by another
independent two-dimensional homogeneous PPP. In this case,
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for VLC networks with and without APs cooperation, the
secrecy performance of the system was evaluated using the
SOP and the ergodic secrecy rate.
V. THE SISO VLC WIRETAP SYSTEM
A. System Model
In this section, we consider the SISO VLC case where the
transmitter is equipped with a single AP. The transmitter
intends to transmit N ∈ N confidential messages to N
AUs, each equipped with a single PD, in the presence of
a set of K spatially dispersed EDs, each equipped with a
single PD. Let {ui|i ∈ J1, NK} be the set of confidential
messages intended to the AUs, where for all i ∈ J1, NK,
ui is the intended confidential message to the ith AU. The
confidential messages are encoded via superposition coding
(SC) into one scalar signal s =
∑N
i=1 ul, that should satisfy the
amplitude constraint in (4), i.e., |s| ≤ A. Since the messages
are transmitted simultaneously in a non-orthogonal fashion,
detection at each AU follows that of NOMA, which involves
power domain multiplexing at the transmitter and successive
interference cancellation (SIC) at each AU [103]–[105]. Based
on the above, for all i ∈ J1, NK and k ∈ J1,KK, the
received signals at the ith AU and the kth ED are expressed,
respectively, as
yi = his+ ni
zk = gks+ wk, (10)
where hi, gk ∈ R+ are the channel gains of the ith AU and the
kth ED, and ni and wk are AWGN samples that are N
(
0, σ2A
)
and N (0, σ2E) distributed, respectively.. For all i ∈ J1, NK
and k ∈ J1,KK, let ρA,i M= h2iσ2A and ρE,k M= g2kσ2E denote the
normalized received SNR at the ith AU and at the kth ED,
respectively. Finally, let ρE =
∑K
k=1 ρE,k. In the following,
we review all the works and results reported in the literature of
secure SISO VLC systems for the cases of single AU multiple
AUs.
B. Single AU
In this subsection, we assume that the transmitter communi-
cates with N = 1 AU. In this case, note that if ρA,1 ≤ ρE , then
the SISO VLC wiretap channel is not degraded and, therefore,
the secrecy capacity Cs = 0 [106]. However, If ρE < ρA,1,
then the SISO VLC wiretap channel is strictly degraded and
the secrecy capacity is not null [106]. Therefore, we assume
to the end of this part that ρE < ρA,1. In this case, It was
shown in [106] that the secrecy capacity achieving probability
distribution is unique, symmetric and discrete with a finite
support set. However, neither the secrecy capacity nor the
optimal input probability distribution were derived in closed-
form and it remains an open problem. Therefore, several upper
and lower bounds were derived in the literature in an attempt
to characterize the secrecy capacity of the system.
The problem of secure SISO VLC systems with a single
AU and single ED with perfect CSI was investigated in [68],
[107]–[109]. In [68], an achievable secrecy rate for the system
was proposed and it is given by R+s,2, such that
Rs,2 =
1
2
log
(
1 +
2A2
2pie
ρA,1
)
− δ√
2piσ2E
exp
(−δ2
2σ2E
)
−
(
1− 2Q
(
δ
σE
+
√
ρEA
))
log
 2 (√ρEA+ δ)√
2pi
(
1− 2Q
(
δ
σE
))

−Q
(
δ
σE
)
+
1
2
,
(11)
where 0 < δ is a free parameter and Q (·) is the Q-function. In
[107], [108], the authors considered the illumination require-
ment of LEDs and added an average optical power constraint
along with the peak-power constraint. Then they derived upper
and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity of the system.
Based on the type of the input distribution ps, i.e., either
continuous or discrete over the interval [−A,A], two achiev-
able secrecy rates were proposed in the literature. Specifically,
assuming that the transmitted signal s is continuous, an
achievable secrecy rate for the system, that was proposed in
[109], is given by R+s,3, such that
Rs,3 =
1
2
log
(
1 +
exp (2hu1)
2pie
ρA,1
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 + σ2u1ρE
)
,
(12)
where hu1 denotes the differential entropy u and σ
2
u1 denotes
its variance. Several continuous input distributions were pro-
posed in the literature, which aim to maximize the achievable
secrecy rate Rs,3, including the uniform distribution, the
truncated Gaussian distribution and the truncated generalized
normal (TGN) distribution [109]. Furthermore, by using dis-
crete probability distributions, another achievable secrecy rate
was proposed in [109]. This achievable secrecy rate is R+s,1 in
(6) for the special case when (M,N,K) = (1, 1, 1).
Fig. 6 presents the upper bound UB in (8), the numerical
calculation of the secrecy capacity Cs and the lower bounds
R+s,1, R
+
s,2 and R
+
s,3, obtained through 10
5 independent Monte-
Carlo trials on the location of the AU and the ED, versus
A2. The secrecy capacity is obtained numerically by using
the same approach invoked in [106], whereas for the lower
bounds R+s,1 and R
+
s,3, the TGN and the TDGN distributions
were adopted, respectively. Specifically, the best parameters
of the TGN and the TDGN distributions are obtained through
brute force (BF) search methods. As shown in this figure, the
lower bound R+s,1, the one that corresponds to the discrete
input distributions with finite support sets, is the best lower
bound, which is not surprising since it is already known that
the optimal input distribution for the degraded SISO VLC
wiretap channel is discrete with a finite support set [106].
When the EDs’ CSI is not available at the transmitter, it
becomes more challenging to characterize the secrecy capacity
and quantify the achievable secrecy rate. To overcome this
obstacle, researchers have proposed invoking stochastic ge-
ometry approaches [109]–[111]. In this context, the locations
of the EDs are treated as random variables, and therefore, one
may quantify the achievable secrecy rates by averaging over
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Fig. 6: Upper bound UB , secrecy capacity Cs and lower
bounds R+s,1, R
+
s,2 and R
+
s,3 versus A
2. σ2A = σ
2
E = −98.83
[dBm].
all possible locations. In [109], only one randomly located
ED is considered, whereas in [110], [111], multiple randomly
located EDs were considered. All receivers, including that of
the AU, were assumed to be uniformly distributed within the
coverage area and their orientation was assumed to be fixed
and facing the transmitter. Specifically, in [109], the statistics
of the received SNRs ρA,1 and ρE were derived, which lead
to evaluating the secrecy performance of the system in terms
of the average secrecy rates E (UB), E
(
R+s,1
)
and E
(
R+s,3
)
.
In [110], [111], the PPP process was used to model the
number of EDs. The main differences between [110], [111]
are as follows. The EDs were assumed to be non-colluding
in [110] and colluding in [111]. In addition, the authors in
[110] studied the impact of multipath reflections on the secrecy
performance, whereas only the LoS component of the channel
gains was considered in [111]. In both papers, the statistics of
the received SNRs were derived, which facilitates evaluating
the secrecy performance in terms of the SOP. Finally, the
lower bound R+s,3 in conjunction with uniform distribution was
adopted as an achievable secrecy rate.
C. Multiple AUs
The problem of secure MU-SISO VLC channels was inves-
tigated in [112]–[115]. The authors in [112], [113] considered
a system comprising a transmitter that intends to send N = 2
confidential messages to two AUs in the presence of an exter-
nal ED. In order to enhance the secrecy performance of this
broadcast system, the authors investigated two transmission
strategies: the direct transmission and the relay-aided transmis-
sion. For the direct transmission strategy, superposition coding
with uniform signaling was used, whereas in the relay-aided
transmission strategy, three secure transmission schemes were
studied, which are
1) Cooperative jamming: the relay acts as a jammer and
sends artificial noise signals in order to degrade the ED
reception.
2) Decode-and-forward: the transmitter sends the informa-
tion bearing signal to the relay, which in turn decodes
and then forwards it to the AU.
3) Amplify and forward: the transmitter sends the informa-
tion bearing signal to the relay, which in turn amplifies
it by infusing more optical power and then forwards it to
the AU.
For all these transmission schemes, the authors derived the
achievable secrecy regions and studied the performance of
each scheme with respect to the geometry of the coverage
area and the location of the ED.
The system model considered in [114], [115] consists of
a transmitter communicating with N AUs in the presence of
a set of EDs, where their number is modeled using a PPP
model. Specifically, in [114], only the AU at the room center
was supposed to be a legitimate user, while all other users were
supposed to be EDs. In addition, all the EDs, including the
remaining AUs, were assumed to be non-cooperative, i.e., they
do not share the eavesdropped information. In this case, only
the ED with the highest received SNR ρE,max was considered
as a potential eavesdropper. Based on this, the statistics of
ρE,max were derived, which yielded a closed-form expression
of the SOP. However, since the closed-form expression of the
secrecy capacity with the input amplitude constraint is not
readily available, the amplitude constraint was ignored and
Gaussian signaling was adopted instead. In [115], a two-user
NOMA-SISO VLC system was considered. The transmitter
communicates simultaneously with two uniformly distributed
AUs within the coverage area. Assuming that the EDs are not
colluding and by considering only the ED with the highest
SNR, the authors derived a closed-form expression for the
SOP for each AU.
VI. HYBRID VLC/RF SYSTEMS
In indoor environments, the light diffused from LED sources
is naturally confined to a small area. In addition, the light
beams are susceptible to indoor blockages, such as the human
body, which may cause severe fluctuations in the received
SNR. Consequently, the hybrid integration of VLC and RF
systems was envisioned to significantly improve the user
experience, since VLC systems can support very high data
rates in specific areas and RF systems can provide greater
coverage area to support mobility [116]–[118]. In addition, one
of the challenges of adopting VLC systems in indoor environ-
ments is the VLC uplink transmission mechanism, especially
if one relies on the existing indoor infrastructure for using
LEDs for illumination and as VLC APs. To overcome these
limitations, two alternatives were proposed in the literature.
The first alternative is the invention of light-fidelity (LiFi)
technology. LiFi is a fully networked optical communication
system that includes both uplink and downlink transmissions
[48]. The uplink operates over the infrared (IR) spectrum while
the downlink operates over the visible light spectrum [48].
The second alternative consists of deploying hybrid wireless
fidelity (WiFi)/LiFi. Both technologies are bidirectional and
can jointly provide high coverage and high data rates. Fig 7
presents an illustration of the hybrid WiFi/LiFi architecture,
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Fig. 7: Illustration of the heterogeneous LiFi-WiFi system.
where the RF AP is a WiFi node and the VLC AP is an
array of LEDs. Since hybrid VLC/RF systems encompass VLC
components and RF components jointly, security for hybrid
VLC/RF systems should be attentively investigated due to the
broadcast nature of both communication systems, which is the
focus of this section.
Security for hybrid VLC/RF networks was investigated in
[119]–[122]. In [119], a downlink hybrid RF/VLC wiretap
system was considered, where one RF AP, equipped with
multiple antennas, and one VLC transmitter, equipped with
multiple LEDs, communicate jointly with one AU in the
presence of one ED. The two receivers were assumed to
have the multi-homing capability, i.e., they can aggregate the
information from the RF and VLC transmitters. The authors
employed beamforming as a transmission strategy and then
optimized over the beamforming vectors and the transmit
powers at both the VLC and RF AP. Then, they formulated
the PLS scheme in order to minimize the total consumed
power while achieving target RF and VLC information rates
at the AU and maintaining zero information rate at the ED. In
[120], [121], a bidirectional hybrid RF/VLC wiretap system
was considered, where one VLC transmitter, equipped with
one AP, transmits confidential messages to a randomly located
AU in the presence of one randomly located ED. In addition,
it was assumed that the two receivers harvest energy from
the light intensity. In addition, the AU communicates with
an RF AP and this uplink transmission of the information is
performed over an RF link that suffers from Rician fading,
while the ED tries to acquire the transmitted information. The
authors derived the secrecy outage probability using stochastic
geometry and evaluated the secrecy performance of the system
with respect to the geometry of the coverage area. Recently,
the authors in [122] investigated the secrecy performance of
a hybrid VLC/RF system equipped with decode-and-forward
relaying, where they developed PLS algorithms based on ZF
beamforming techniques that mitigate eavesdropping in both
RF and VLC networks.
VII. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Although many papers have been published on various as-
pects of VLC systems, we believe there are still many open
problems that need to be addressed to bring the potential of
VLC-related technologies to their full potential. Since this
paper is concerned with security, we dedicate the rest of this
section to highlighting a number of open research problems
related to security for VLC.
A. Input Signaling Schemes
The input signaling schemes present a fundamental feature in
designing wireless communication systems. In fact, any trans-
mission scheme and the resulting system performance depend
on the type of adopted input signaling scheme. In general, each
input signaling scheme consists of two main parts, namely,
the input probability distribution and the precoding scheme,
also known as the transmission strategy. The input probability
distribution defines the probability distribution according to
which the signals are transmitted. This can be either con-
tinuous or discrete. The precoding scheme defines the form
or the shape of the transmitted signal, and it includes the
modulation scheme as well. Among the well known precoding
schemes for the case of a single AU, one can cite beamform-
ing, artificial noise based beamforming, OFDM and spatial
modulation [123], [124], etc. On the other hand, for the case
of multiple AUs, one can cite linear precoding, such as GSVD-
based precoding and ZF precoding, orthogonal multiple acces
(OMA) such as orthogonal frequency division multiple access
(OFDMA) [125], NOMA [126], [127] and spatial modulation.
As shown in previous sections, the input signaling scheme has
a high impact on the secrecy performance of VLC systems.
However, the optimal input signaling scheme for secure VLC
systems is still an open problem.
Recall that VLC systems impose a peak-power constraint,
i.e. amplitude constraint, on the channel input, which is funda-
mentally different from the average power constraint. In fact,
when average power constraints are imposed, it was shown that
Gaussian signaling schemes are optimal [49]. However, from
an information theoretic point of view, finding the optimal
input signaling schemes that achieve the secrecy capacity of
a Gaussian wiretap channel under an amplitude constraint is
still an open problem. This is attributed to the fact that, when
input distributions of unbounded support like Gaussian inputs
are not permissible, the optimal input distribution is either
unknown or only known to be discrete for the special cases of
a degraded SISO wiretap channel [106] and a MISO wiretap
channel [87]. Given that VLC falls into this category since
amplitude constraints must be satisfied, the optimal signaling
scheme for secure VLC systems is still an open problem.
B. PLS for Indoor VLC Systems: What is Missing?
The basic PLS techniques employed to secure VLC sys-
tems that are reported in the literature are summarized in Table
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Table II: PLS techniques for secure indoor VLC systems.
Continuous signaling scheme Discrete signaling scheme
MIMO
Single AU
Single ED [61] [62]
Multiple EDs ∅ [63]
Multiple AUs
Single ED ∅
Multiple EDs [64] ∅
MISO
Single AU
Single ED [67]–[75] [76]–[81]
Multiple EDs [83]–[85] [86]
Multiple AUs
Without EDs [93]–[96] ∅
Single ED [97]–[100] ∅
Multiple EDs [101] ∅
SISO
Single AU
Single ED [68], [107]–[109] [109]
Multiple EDs [110], [111] ∅
Multiple AUs
Single ED [112], [113] ∅
Multiple EDs [114], [115] ∅
Hybrid RF/VLC
Single AU
Single ED [119]–[122] ∅
Multiple EDs
Multiple AUs
Single ED ∅
Multiple EDs
II. By having a closer look at this table, one can note that there
is a good number of problems related to secure indoor VLC
systems that have not been resolved or even considered. A list
of these problems is detailed on the following.
1) For the MU-MISO VLC broadcast channel considered
in subsection IV-B, all previous works used only contin-
uous input distributions. However, adopting continuous
input signaling is unrealistic since digital data streams
should be transmitted. In addition, discrete input signaling
has been shown to be optimal for the two-user IM-
DD discrete memoryless free space optical broadcast
channels with non-negativity, peak and average intensity
constraints at the transmitter [128]. Although it is not
straightforward to derive optimal precoding schemes for
secure communications in MU-MISO VLC broadcast
channels with an arbitrary number of AUs using discrete
distributions, there is a good chance that the secrecy per-
formance of these systems may be enhanced by adopting
this class of input distributions.
2) In the same context, note that the majority of works in
the literature that investigated the secrecy performance of
MU-MISO VLC broadcast channels assumed that there
is at least one passive ED that can exist within the
coverage area. Such an assumption may be neither valid
nor realistic in some practical scenarios. In fact, from a
security point of view, one can not predict or estimate the
number of potential EDs existing in the same coverage
area that are capable of extracting confidential informa-
tion from legitimate users. Therefore, investigating the
secrecy performance of MU-MISO VLC systems serving
a set of AUs in the presence of a set of passive EDs may
be interesting, since it would be a generalization of the
results derived in the existing research works.
3) The secrecy performance of the MU-MIMO VLC broad-
cast channel adopted in has not been investigated in
the literature. In a typical MU-MIMO VLC broadcast
channel, the transmitter is equipped with multiple APs
and serves multiple AUs, each equipped with multiple
PDs, in the presence of a set of colluding EDs with
imperfect CSI. This model is not only a generalized
model that encompasses all the VLC systems adopted in
the literature but also the most realistic one [129], [130].
Therefore, investigating the secrecy performance of this
system is also an important contribution to the topic of
secure VLC systems.
C. Incorporating Realistic and Measurements Based VLC
Channel Models
All of the studies on secure VLC systems reported in the
literature employed the VLC channel model presented in
section II. In this model, it usually assumed that the receiver
in an indoor VLC system is either stationary or uniformly
distributed within the area of interest and that its orientation is
constant (vertically upward and fixed). However, the presence
of mobility and device orientation as well as link blockage,
which are inherent features of wireless networks, require more
realistic and non uniform models. In addition, none of the
previous studies on secure VLC systems have considered the
actual statistics of the receiver’s mobility and orientation. This
is attributed to the simplicity of the adopted model and also
to the lack of proper channel models for the mobility and
orientation of VLC devices in indoor scenarios. Nevertheless,
several measurement-based channel models for VLC system
were derived recently for various environments, such as indoor
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VLC systems [131]–[137], VLC-based vehicular communica-
tion [138] and underwater VLC systems [139], [140].
In general, a receiver in a VLC system can be mobile and
can have a random orientation. From section II, the channel
gain of an indoor VLC receiver is expressed as
h = C cos(θ)m
cos(ψ)
d2
rect
(
ψ
Ψ
)
, (13)
where C =
η RT (m+ 1)
2pi
n2cAg
sin(Ψ)2 . The user’s mobility will
induce randomness in the distance d, the angle of transmission
θ as well as the angle of incidence ψ, whereas the random
orientation of the user’s device will induce randomness only
in the angle of incidence ψ. Recently, the authors in [133]–
[136] derived measurement-based VLC channel models for
indoor VLC receivers with random orientation, where they
showed that the incidence angle ψ follows a truncated Laplace
distribution if the receiver is stationary and a truncated Gaus-
sian distribution if the receiver is mobile. The experimental
measurements were obtained for both sitting and walking
activities, in portrait and landscape modes as shown in Fig. 8.
The impact of device orientation on LoS link availability is
assessed in [141]. In [142], the authors used the Laplace
distribution to derive the pdf of SNR and BER of indoor
VLC systems analytically. It was shown that the random
orientation of a device can influence the user’s performance,
which depends on its location.
Considering the receiver’s mobility, several mobility models
have been proposed in the literature to model the distribution
of mobile users in indoor scenarios. The most commonly
used mobility model in indoor systems is the random way-
point (RWP) mobility model [143]–[147]. In this stochastic
model, each user of the network uniformly chooses a random
destination point (“waypoint”) in a given deployment area.
A user moves to this destination with a velocity v chosen
uniformly in the interval [vmin, vmax]. When it reaches the
destination, it remains static for a random pause time and
then starts moving again according to the same rule. Recently,
the authors in [148], [149] derived the channel statistics for
indoor mobile VLC receivers using the RWP mobility model,
where the receiver’s orientation is assumed to be fixed in [148]
and uniformly distributed in [149]. In addition, motivated by
the results of [148], the authors in [150] investigated the
secrecy performance of the strongest AU in a SISO NOMA
VLC system in the presence of multiple mobile and colluding
EDs, where the receivers’ orientation was assumed to be fixed
and their mobility was characterized using the RWP mobility
model. Based on this, the channel statistics and the SOP of
the strongest AU were derived using stochastic geometry.
Based on the above discussion, re-investigating the secrecy
performance of VLC systems by considering the aforemen-
tioned measurement-based channel models and mobility mod-
els presents an interesting future research direction, since it
helps to develop adequate PLS techniques for VLC systems
in practical and real-life scenarios. Furthermore, in order to
analyze the performance of mobile users more realistically,
an orientation-based RWP (ORWP) mobility model was first
proposed in [135] and then extended in [136]. The ORWP
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Fig. 8: Illustration of experimental setup for both sitting and
walking activities.
model provides a more realistic framework for performance
evaluation of mobile users in VLC systems by incorporating
the orientation of the device and the mobility of the user.
Therefore, studying the secrecy performance for mobile users
according to the ORWP mobility model can be another future
research topic.
The VLC channel is also susceptible to link blockage.
Due to the inherent nature of the VLC channel, the link
between a pair of receiver and transmitter can be interrupted
by obstructions such as a human body or other similar objects.
However, it is noted that the main cause of link blockage is
the mobile users in the indoor environment. The blockers can
be modeled either as cylindrical objects [151] or rectangular
prisms [152]. When the communication link is interrupted
by blockers, adding extra power cannot compensate for the
data loss. Solutions to simplify the effect of link blockage
were introduced in [136], [153], [154]. A multi-directional
receiver (MDR) for which PDs are located at different sides
of a smartphone is introduced in [136], [153] and has been
assessed in the presence of link blockage, user mobility as
well as device random orientation. It is denoted that the
MDR structure outperforms the conventional configuration for
which all PDs are placed on one side of a smartphones, for
example on the screen side. In [154], the author proposed an
omnidirectional receiver in which PDs are embedded on all
sides of a smartphone. This configuration is a robust scheme
against blockage. Its superior performance is compared to
a single-PD and two-PD configurations. Accordingly, the
secrecy performance of the VLC system can be evaluated
in the presence of blockers with different densities in an
indoor environment. Moreover, the MDR configuration and
omnidirectional receiver are the other two interesting future
perspectives that should be studied from a secrecy performance
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Fig. 9: Illustration of V2X communication.
aspect.
D. Security for Outdoor VLC systems
Outdoor VLC applications are less explored when compared
to their indoor counterparts. This is mainly due to two facts: 1)
the dual use of light-emitting diodes is not always practical in
an outdoor VLC environment, and 2) the level of interference
and noise is considerably higher in outdoor environments.
Nevertheless, several outdoor VLC applications have been
identified in the literature. The adoption of VLC in outdoor
applications was reviewed in [155], where the authors revealed
the issues that arise in the outdoor usage of VLC, identified
emerging challenges and proposed future research directions.
In this context, VLC outdoor applications include, but are not
limited to, [156],
1) Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication.
2) Building-to-building (B2B) communication.
V2X communications is a new concept that uses the latest
generation of information and communication technology that
connect vehicles to everything. In its turn, and as shown in
Fig. 9, V2X communication includes [157]
1) Vehicle to building (V2B) communication.
2) Vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communication, also
known as road to vehicle (R2V) communication.
3) Vehicle to network (V2N), also known as vehicle-to-cloud
(V2C) communications.
4) Vehicle to pedestrian (V2P) communication.
5) Vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication.
The V2X technology links the various elements of transporta-
tion, such as pedestrians, vehicles, roads, and cloud environ-
ments. This leads to the building of an intelligent transport
system and promoting the development of new modes and new
forms of automobiles and transportation services by gathering
Fig. 10: Illustration of bidirectional B2B communication.
more information and promote the innovation and application
of automated driving technology [158]. In addition, V2X
communication is of great significance for improving traffic
efficiency, saving resources, reducing accidents, and improving
traffic management [158], [159]
On the other hand, B2B communications define all the
communications technologies that enable connection between
buildings, as shown in Fig 10. Both RF and FSO (including
the visible light and the IR spectra) communications is used
for this type of mission [160]. Therefore, VLC may be used to
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connect buildings situated within a reasonable distance from
each other, such as campuses, bank buildings, and headquarters
to provide access to information, data and media.
For outdoor applications of VLC, security issues arise
naturally for VLC-based V2X communication and VLC-
based B2B communication. Specifically, for the case of V2X
communications, vehicles commonly use RF, FSO or VLC
wireless communication techniques for both V2V and V2I
communications. Manufacturers, regulators and the public are
understandably concerned about large-scale systems failure
or malicious attacks via these wireless vehicular networks.
In this context, only a few papers have recently investigated
the security problems in V2X communications. In [161],
common V2X threats as well as security issues and security
requirements of V2X in cellular network were reviewed, where
the authors discussed existing V2X authentication solutions
proposed in the literature. In [162], the authors presented
an implementation and evaluation of the use of ultrasonic
audio and image camera visual light side-channels for secure
V2V communications. The constraints imposed by these side-
channels necessitates the development of new schemes for
small throughput, secure and attributable exchange of session
key information between vehicles. Therefore, the authors used
Blockchain as a V2V message transport, since it provides
a secure, verifiable, shared, open and distributed ledger. In
[163], the authors studied the secrecy performance of vehicular
heterogeneous networks from a PLS point of view. In fact, the
considered network model contains an ED, and the security
problem was formulated using stochastic geometry. Finally, a
secure cooperative communication scheme was proposed to
enhance the secrecy performance of the system. Except [163],
none of the works reported in the literature has studied the
potential of PLS in providing secure V2X communications,
for both RF and VLC wireless networks.
Based on the above, improving the security of VLC-based
V2X communications and VLC-based B2B communications
from a PLS point of view can be considered as a potential
future work. However, some fundamental features should be
clearly defined and deeply investigated before performing
security analysis. These features include:
• The framework and the network configuration, such as
distances, dimensions, transmit light sources, optical re-
ceivers, etc.
• Realistic and measurement-based channel models should
be derived. These channel models should encompass the
effect of interference as there are fewer physical barriers
in outdoor environments (unlike the indoor environment).
• The effect of sunlight during the day, outdoor illumina-
tion during the night, and weather conditions should be
studied. It has been shown that solar irradiance does not
prevent high speed VLC communication [164]. However,
careful considerations and system design are required to
minimize the effect of those sources of impairment on
the performance of VLC systems.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We provided in this paper a comprehensive and comparative
review of all PLS techniques reported in the literature that
aim to enhance the security of VLC systems. The reported
techniques cover both information theoretic and signal pro-
cessing aspects of VLC systems. Different types of VLC
systems were considered, including SISO, MISO and MIMO
VLC systems, as well as hybrid RF/VLC systems. In addition,
we considered the impact of various VLC features on the
secrecy performance, including the input signaling schemes,
the geometry and parameters of the network, the number of
legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers, and the CSI availabil-
ity at the transmitting nodes. We also listed a number of
open research problems that have great potential for advancing
the state-of-the-art of security for VLC systems. What has
been accomplished so far in the totality of the research works
on security for VLC systems, albeit being fundamental and
original, it serves as a starting point for developing realistic
PLS techniques tailored to real-world settings in an effort to
bring the deployment of VLC-based systems (such as LiFi)
closer than ever.
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